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WHY JOHN MCCAIN WAS  
A CITIZEN AT BIRTH 
Stephen E. Sachs* † 
Introduction 
Senator John McCain was born a citizen in 1936. Professor Gabriel J. 
Chin challenges this view in this Symposium, arguing that McCain’s birth in 
the Panama Canal Zone (while his father was stationed there by the Navy) 
fell into a loophole in the governing statute. The best historical evidence, 
however, suggests that this loophole is an illusion and that McCain is a 
“natural born Citizen” eligible to be president. 
A person need not be born on U.S. soil to be a citizen at birth. Section 
1993 of the Revised Statutes, the statute defining foreign-born citizenship at 
the time of McCain’s birth, made citizens of certain children “born out of 
the limits and jurisdiction of the United States.” The Canal Zone was “out of 
the limits” of the United States—i.e., outside its borders and outside the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s grant of citizenship to those born “in the United 
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof.” But the United States had 
exclusive control of the Canal Zone at the time, arguably placing it within 
U.S. “jurisdiction” if not its limits. Thus, Chin claims, McCain was not 
“born out of the limits and jurisdiction of the United States,” falling instead 
into a “gap in the law.” When Congress changed the law in 1937, it would 
have been too late for McCain to become a natural born citizen (assuming, 
with Chin, that this means a citizen at birth). 
Chin’s sophisticated analysis deserves to be taken seriously, but history 
may point in another direction. The key statutory language, “the limits and 
jurisdiction of the United States,” was first added in 1795. At the time, this 
language apparently referred to a unitary concept—the United States proper, 
the area within its borders—rather than two independent concepts of “lim-
its” and “jurisdiction.” Like “metes and bounds” or “cease and desist,” the 
phrase was a mere repetition—a doublet, or (in the words of Judge Posner) 
one of the many “form[s] of redundancy in which lawyers delight.” To be 
born “out of the limits and jurisdiction of the United States,” it seems, was 
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historically understood as synonymous—and not just coextensive—with 
being born outside the United States proper. 
The historical usage of the phrase and its continuous construction over 
the first century after 1795 supports this reading. Early interpreters—
including scholars, congressmen, and state and federal courts—repeatedly 
referred to the “limits and jurisdiction” of the United States to mean the 
same thing as the nation’s “limits” (i.e., its borders). Indeed, the term “limits 
and jurisdiction” was frequently used this way in contexts unrelated to citi-
zenship. When separate requirements of limits and jurisdiction might 
otherwise have conflicted, courts and commentators uniformly adhered to a 
unitary interpretation of the statute. This interpretation was also consistent 
with the recognized purposes of the citizenship statutes, avoiding the ab-
surdities of a restrictive reading. Only recently have some questioned this 
traditional interpretation; but because Congress did not alter the key lan-
guage between 1795 and 1936, the provision’s original meaning was 
preserved up to the date of McCain’s birth. Thus, the balance of the evi-
dence favors a view that John McCain—and other children like him—were 
citizens of the United States from birth. 
I. The Text of the Statutes 
A. Origins and Early Readings 
Congress declared in 1790 that “the children of citizens of the United 
States, that may be born beyond sea, or out of the limits of the United 
States, shall be considered as natural born citizens.” Under this 1790 Act, 
McCain would undoubtedly have become a citizen at birth. But in 1795, in 
the course of amending the naturalization rules, Congress enacted a revised 
text that referred instead to children “born out of the limits and jurisdiction 
of the United States.” 
Assuming that McCain’s status at birth rested only on statutory law (i.e., 
ignoring his potentially strong claim to citizenship at common law), whether 
he is eligible to be president depends on the meaning of this 1795 language. 
Congress retained the phrase “limits and jurisdiction” in the 1802 and 1855 
versions of the statute, the latter of which was codified as Revised Statutes 
section 1993. When that section was itself amended in 1934, the language 
was left unaltered (the House report described it as “[e]xisting law in which 
no change is proposed”), thus preserving the phrase from 1795 through 
McCain’s birth in 1936. 
On Chin’s account, the words of the 1795 Act applied only to children 
born outside both the limits and the jurisdiction of the United States. He 
reads “out of the . . . jurisdiction” as excluding anyone who might be “sub-
ject to [U.S.] jurisdiction” in the language of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
i.e., anyone born owing allegiance to the United States and obliged to obey 
U.S. law. A few special groups—such as foreign ambassadors’ families and 
Native American tribes (prior to a 1924 statute)—were not subject to U.S. 
jurisdiction even if they resided within its borders, while those born in out-
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lying possessions (like the Canal Zone) were subject to U.S. jurisdiction 
even if outside its limits. 
Did the words added to the 1795 Act really effect such a change in 
meaning? Or did the Act merely paraphrase the earlier law it replaced? 
While other aspects of the 1795 Act were controversial, there appears to 
have been no debate over this specific change. The only potential statement 
in the recorded debates suggests that the new language carried precisely the 
same meaning as the old. When James Madison reported a draft version of 
the Act concerning rules for naturalization, he also included “whatever was 
necessary from the Old Law, so that the latter should be entirely super-
seded”—including, presumably, the old provision on foreign-born citizens. 
Prior to the twentieth century, those who discussed the 1790 and 1795 
laws together uniformly identified no difference in their content. For exam-
ple, the scholar Horace Binney wrote in 1854 that this section “re-enacted 
the clauses of the [1790 Act] in the same or precisely equivalent terms.” In 
1860, a New York court in Ludlam v. Ludlam noted that “[b]y both these 
statutes it was enacted that all children of citizens, born out of the limits of 
the United States, should be considered citizens.” 
Accordingly, early interpreters of the 1795 Act read that statute, like its 
predecessor, as applying to all children born outside the United States. In 
1798, a House bill listing categories of U.S. citizenship included the 
“[c]hildren of citizens of the United States . . . born at any place out of the 
limits of the United States.” During the nineteenth century, members of 
Congress as well as several state courts used similar phrases to describe the 
statute’s reach. For example, Senator Daniel Webster in 1848 described the 
language of “limits and jurisdiction” as applying to those “born out of the 
limits of the United States,” and the title of the 1855 Act described it as con-
cerning children of U.S. citizens “Born out of the Limits Thereof.” In a 1907 
amendment to the citizenship statute, Congress described its understanding 
of the prevailing law in these terms: It demanded an oath of allegiance from 
“all children born outside the limits of the United States who are citizens 
thereof in accordance with the provisions of [section 1993] of the Revised 
Statutes.” 
Nineteenth-century interpreters of the citizenship statutes routinely em-
ployed phrases such as “out of the limits” or “out of the United States” 
alone, even when directly referring to the phrase “out of the limits and juris-
diction of the United States.” Apparently, no one objected to this practice. 
As far as I can discover, not a single court, commentator, or congressman 
attached any significance to the words “and jurisdiction” for the first century 
after their enactment. 
B. “Limits and Jurisdiction” in Other Contexts 
Why did early Americans speak as if “limits” and “limits and jurisdic-
tion” meant the same thing? Perhaps this was error, or a misleading form of 
shorthand. But a better explanation may be that “limits and jurisdiction” had 
the same meaning as “limits” alone—that the phrase was a particular type of 
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redundancy known as a “doublet.” As Bryan Garner notes in his manual on 
legal style, “[t]he doublet and triplet phrasing common in Middle English 
still survives in legal writing.” Consider the “metes and bounds” of property, 
or an order to “cease and desist”—or, in the Constitution, the “Aid and 
Comfort” given to enemies, the “Revision and Control” of customs duties, 
and the amendments that are valid to all “Intents and Purposes.” In each 
case, the “and” of the pairing is merely one component of a larger phrase, 
rather than a logical operator conjoining two distinct concepts. (The repeti-
tion, one might say, is merely “belts and suspenders.”) 
The 1795 Act’s use of “limits and jurisdiction” may have illustrated 
what the Supreme Court in Marshall v. Lonberger called the “lawyer’s well-
known penchant for redundancy.” For example, in 1789, Pennsylvania ban-
ished certain convicts “to some place or places without the bounds, limits 
and jurisdiction of the United States.” This is an obvious triplet: No one 
could read the words “bounds,” “limits,” and “jurisdiction” as each denoting 
a distinct area, with convicts to be sent beyond the union of all three. In-
stead, the words were just component parts of a single colorful phrase. 
The same can be said of “limits and jurisdiction” in other contexts. In 
1793, Chief Justice John Jay used the phrase in Henfield’s Case to indicate 
the territory in which certain acts could be punished if committed by aliens 
“while in this country,” in light of America’s “sovereign[ty] within its own 
dominions”—language indicating a geographic area, rather than a personal 
status relevant to ambassadors or Native American tribes. Missouri statutes 
in the mid-1820s used the phrases “beyond the limits of the United States” 
and “beyond seas or without the limits and jurisdiction of the United States” 
interchangeably in describing who could benefit from the tolling of statutes 
of limitations. In 1838, members of Congress discussed war subsidies paid 
by Great Britain to “Indian tribes within the territorial limits and jurisdiction 
of the United States”; although these tribes were a paradigm case of not be-
ing “subject to the jurisdiction thereof” under the Fourteenth Amendment, 
they were still located within America’s borders. 
The phrase “limits and jurisdiction” need not always have been a redun-
dancy; in some contexts, the two individual terms carried separate and 
distinct meanings as they do today. But “[j]urisdiction,” the Supreme Court 
observed in Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, “is a word of 
many, too many, meanings”; and at least one of these meanings was histori-
cally synonymous with “borders” or “limits.” For example, the Admissions 
Clause of the Constitution requires that “no new State shall be formed or 
erected within the Jurisdiction of any other State”; but this would not let 
Congress form new states within federal forts and arsenals, from which an-
other kind of state jurisdiction is excluded. An early version of the 1790 Act 
likewise used “jurisdiction” to mean “borders,” referring to lands “within 
the United States” that might occasionally forfeit to “the State wherein such 
lands shall be, or”—if that condition could not be satisfied—to “the United 
States, if such lands shall not be within the jurisdiction of any individual 
State.” To be in a state and to be within the jurisdiction of that state here 
meant the same thing. 
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The territorial uses of “jurisdiction” can be contrasted with phrases such 
as “under the jurisdiction” or “subject to the jurisdiction,” which typically 
concerned state authority and protection rather than geographical area. The 
1795 Act used “jurisdiction” in both senses: It allowed aliens residing 
“within the limits and under the jurisdiction of the United States” to be natu-
ralized if they had resided “two years, at least, within and under the 
jurisdiction of the same,” and “one year, at least, within [the same] state or 
territory.” Residing “under” U.S. jurisdiction was one thing; residing 
“within” that jurisdiction was another, and was here treated as synonymous 
with residing within the nation’s geographic limits. Likewise, members of 
Congress in 1828 stated that Indians were “within the territorial jurisdic-
tion” of particular states by virtue of being “within [their] limits”; 
Chancellor Kent used the phrase similarly in his famous Commentaries. 
This repeated usage—consistent with that of contemporary statutes and 
official communications—counsels against reading “jurisdiction” as having 
the same meaning in all contexts. To be born “out of the limits and jurisdic-
tion of the United States” in early America may have meant no more than to 
be born outside its limits. 
C. Application to Actual Cases 
If the citizenship statutes used “limits and jurisdiction” to mean some-
thing other than “limits,” then presumably contemporary interpreters would 
have recognized this difference. This is especially true when such a differ-
ence could have altered the outcome of concrete cases, with children 
arguably meeting one requirement but not the other. In the only historical 
cases I have identified, however, the children in question were uniformly 
held to be citizens. 
1. Native Americans  
Before they were granted citizenship in 1924, Native Americans resided 
in the United States but were not “subject to the jurisdiction thereof.” When 
citizens and Native Americans bore children together, separate rules about 
tribal membership—and not the foreign-born citizenship statutes—
determined whether those children were citizens, even if they had been born 
in the United States. Indeed, in 1818, a South Carolina court interpreted the 
statutes’ reference to “limits and jurisdiction” in solely geographic terms, 
discussing a birth in Indian lands as if it might have been in a foreign coun-
try outside the limits of the United States. The plaintiff in Davis v. Hall 
argued that “a person born within the limits of a territory occupied and 
claimed by a nation of American Indians, is an alien.” The unanimous Court 
of Constitutional Appeals did not ask whether the child would be subject to 
the jurisdiction of the United States, instead noting that the case “has been 
specifically provided for” by statute. The court found it irrelevant whether 
“the place of birth were without the jurisdiction or limits of the United 
States,” for citizenship would descend “whether that place be within the 
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jurisdiction or limits of the United States or not.” This geographic reading of 
the statute was hardly consistent with independent requirements of “limits” 
and “jurisdiction,” and the reporter’s headnote summarized the holding in 
similarly geographic terms: “Where a Father has been a citizen of the 
United States, his Son is entitled to the privileges of citizenship, although 
born without the limits of the United States.” 
2. Birth Aboard Ships  
Like foreign ambassadors, a foreign government’s ships carried with 
them a bubble of extraterritorial jurisdiction. But private ships were also 
subject to a form of jurisdiction abroad. In 1861, a federal circuit court con-
cluded in United States v. Gordon that acts within the internal waters of a 
foreign nation—a place normally outside the jurisdiction of American 
courts—could still be subject to U.S. jurisdiction if those acts took place on 
“an American vessel, owned by American citizens.” Nevertheless, the court 
had no difficulty accepting that a child born aboard a vessel in such circum-
stances would be a citizen at birth. Justice Samuel Nelson instructed the jury 
that “even if the defendant was born during one of those voyages . . . he 
would still be regarded in law as an American citizen, although thus born 
abroad.” The full court added that “there was no error in this part of the 
charge,” noting that in context it “clearly referred to a possible birth of the 
defendant on board of his father’s American vessel, while the latter was in a 
foreign country.” While those born on such a vessel would, in the court’s 
view, still be subject to U.S. jurisdiction in one meaning of the term, it read 
the foreign-born citizenship statutes as concerning nothing more than geog-
raphy. 
3. Extraterritorial Jurisdiction by Treaty  
Over the nineteenth century, the United States obtained extraterritorial 
privileges in many foreign nations. In such countries, according to a 1906 
State Department report, the “national sovereignty of law [was] transferred 
bodily into a foreign soil and made applicable to [U.S. citizens] dwelling 
there.” For example, an 1858 treaty with China provided that “[a]ll ques-
tions in regards to rights whether of property or person, arising between 
citizens of the United States in China shall be subject to the jurisdiction and 
regulated by the authorities of their own Government.” Yet an 1864 regula-
tion specifically charged the American consul in China with recording “[t]he 
birth and death of every American citizen within the limits of his jurisdic-
tion,” which implies that children “subject to the jurisdiction” of the United 
States could still obtain their citizenship by birth. 
Several contemporaneous opinions by State Department officials made 
this implication explicit. From 1790 on, the citizenship statutes had sought 
to prevent the formation of permanent enclaves of U.S. citizens abroad by 
requiring that the fathers of foreign-born citizens have previously “resided 
in the United States.” In 1887, the Acting Secretary of State argued that this 
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limitation “d[id] not apply to the descendants of citizens of the United 
States” in an extraterritorial community in Turkey; instead, “[s]uch descen-
dants [were] to be regarded, through their inherited extraterritorial rights 
recognized by Turkey herself, as born and continuing in the jurisdiction of 
the United States.” This relaxation of the father-residence rule was a stretch; 
the communities in Turkey were never really “in” the United States. It was 
not controversial, however, that parents in extraterritorial communities were 
able to pass on their citizenship at all. Even though their children were rec-
ognized—in the Acting Secretary’s words—as “born and continuing in the 
jurisdiction of the United States,” this was no barrier to citizenship when the 
fathers had truly resided in the United States. In 1902, Secretary of State 
John Hay asserted that “[i]f the father was a citizen of the United States 
when the son was born [in Turkey], the son was himself born a citizen of the 
United States,” even while noting in the same breath that that the son was 
“born in a country in which the United States exercises extra territorial ju-
risdiction.” If the 1795 Act’s language had a plain meaning excluding 
children like McCain from citizenship, this meaning was lost on the courts 
and officials charged with enforcing it. 
II. Text and Purpose 
In weighing this historical evidence, we should not lose sight of how 
odd a restrictive interpretation would be. Of all children born abroad, why 
exclude those who already have a close relationship to our government and 
laws? 
Even stranger, Chin’s reading would deny citizenship to children of am-
bassadors and troops abroad regardless of where they were stationed. Like 
ambassadors, soldiers stationed abroad are traditionally subject to the juris-
diction of their home country; and the children of these soldiers, like those 
of ambassadors, were recognized at common law as having the same juris-
dictional status as their parents. If the statute really imposed separate 
requirements of “limits” and “jurisdiction,” then the Canal Zone’s status is 
irrelevant; any child born to ambassadors or soldiers abroad would fail the 
test. In fact, the 1795 Act’s language would have had little contemporary 
effect except to deny citizenship to these children. It is hard to believe that 
Congress would have taken this measure without debate or even contempo-
rary notice. 
There is no evidence that anyone in 1795 wanted to restrict citizenship 
in this manner. The only relevant discussion in the debates suggests that the 
Act was meant to replicate, rather than depart from, its predecessor. And 
while the restrictive reading would have affected few places in early 
America, this hardly provides a positive reason to enact it. Chin imagines 
that such places would not have been “considered fit for women and chil-
dren,” imputing to Congress the view that “births in foreign ports on all-
male U.S. Navy ships[] would be sufficiently irregular and unusual” as to 
exclude the children from citizenship. But the historical record contains no 
evidence of such concerns. And here a page of history is worth a volume of 
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speculation: When the courts indeed encountered a child born aboard a 
U.S.-flagged ship, no such doubts were expressed. 
By contrast, there was a great deal of contemporary recognition of an-
other legislative purpose: to make the citizenship of these children 
independent of their place of birth. The 1790 Act, like its British predeces-
sors, took a general approach; but for certain named exceptions, anyone not 
a citizen by place of birth could become one by parentage. Chin reads the 
“limits and jurisdiction” language of the 1795 Act as more restrictive than 
its predecessor. But the 1802 Act employed the same phrase in a manner 
strongly suggesting a gapless reading of the statute as a whole, providing 
that “the children of persons who now are, or have been citizens of the 
United States, shall, though born out of the limits and jurisdiction of the 
United States, be considered as citizens of the United States.” In other 
words, the provision referred to the children of U.S. citizens born anywhere 
in the world, declaring them to be citizens themselves—even if, not having 
been born within the United States proper, they might not have been citizens 
otherwise. 
Early Americans consistently described the statutes’ purpose in this 
fashion—as ensuring, as Massachusetts’ high court put it in Inhabitants of 
Manchester v. Inhabitants of Boston, that children of U.S. citizens would 
enjoy their parents’ status “whether born within the United States or not.” 
When two readings of a text can each be supported linguistically, the one in 
better accord with a statute’s structure and purpose was more likely the one 
relied on by those who drafted the law. In the absence of any apparent 
(much less coherent) motive for Congress to restrict citizenship in this way, 
these considerations strongly favor a gapless reading of the text. 
Conclusion 
After a century of consistent interpretation, a new reading of “limits and 
jurisdiction” emerged in the early 1900s. The spread of this new reading, 
however, should hardly be surprising. If mistaken, it was the kind of mistake 
that no one could have made before America acquired vast unincorporated 
possessions, subject to U.S. control even as their inhabitants were famously 
excluded from America’s limits (and the benefits appurtenant thereto). Read 
alone and out of context, the words “limits” and “jurisdiction” began to pull 
in different directions. In 1898, the Supreme Court in United States v. Wong 
Kim Ark claimed to construe the words of the Fourteenth Amendment—
concerning those born “in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction 
thereof”—as “the converse” of the limits-and-jurisdiction phrase “habitually 
used in the naturalization acts.” In the twentieth century, some came to read 
this dictum as supporting a restrictive reading, importing the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s separate conditions into the statute’s more unified language. 
But this view was hardly unanimous. Others read the Court’s use of 
“converse” to mean “negation,” meaning that anyone not guaranteed citizen-
ship under the Fourteenth Amendment could potentially obtain it under the 
statute. For example, the State Department understood the Court’s decision 
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this way in 1929, when it declared that children like McCain—born to 
American parents in the Canal Zone—were citizens at birth. In the Depart-
ment’s view, it was “not proper to consider the word ‘jurisdiction’ as 
disconnected with the word ‘limits’ ”; instead, the phrase conveyed “a single 
idea,” which was “the antithesis” of the Fourteenth Amendment’s test for 
citizenship and which applied to all those born “outside of the United States 
proper,” including “those born in the unincorporated territories.” 
The State Department had it right. To read the citizenship statutes as im-
posing separate conditions of “limits” and “jurisdiction,” and as excluding 
children like McCain, would not only produce bizarre results: It would also 
be something of an anachronism. The statutory language had been preserved 
unaltered since 1795, and the Third Congress had no obligation to speak in 
any other way than would allow it to be understood by its contemporaries. 
“Limits and jurisdiction” was frequently employed as a doublet in early 
America, and if it was not one in the 1795 Act, no one seems to have re-
marked on that fact for more than a hundred years. 
Of course, no one in 1795 thought to mention all the absurd conse-
quences the Act would not produce. Perhaps the early constructions of the 
statutes were mistakes or overgeneralizations; perhaps Congress’s true pur-
pose went unrecognized and early courts and officials repeatedly erred in 
their application of the law. But we must weigh the evidence as we find it, 
and the balance of that evidence suggests that John McCain was a citizen at 
birth. 
